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Body Extension and the Law: Medical Devices, Intellectual Property, 
Prosthetics and Marginalisation (Again)    
This interdisciplinary paper, drawing on empirical and doctrinal research 
regarding artificial limbs and digital avatars, analyses two concepts which are 
argued to be core to the person – integrity and identity. From the perspective of a 
person who is a prosthetic user, the paper then evaluates the extent to which two 
legal regimes which are highly relevant to prosthetics, medical devices regulation 
(and its delivery) and intellectual property (and its power), engage with the 
person, integrity and identity with a focus on approaches taken to authority and 
control. The paper criticises the meaning which law generates regarding the 
person. It calls for new approaches to be taken by the legal regimes explored to 
the person, identity and integrity; and for a new multifaceted interdisciplinary 
driven approach to the person. 
Keywords: Person; integrity; identity; intellectual property; medical devices.  
1. Introduction  
Human beings – persons bounded in a physiological form – sit at the heart of 
many of our governance frameworks, both moral and legal.  The law often focuses, 
however, on particular outcomes rather than the person; law leaves mostly unaddressed 
much that might be important to the identity, boundaries and expression of the person. At 
the same time, the ability of the law to effectively govern the increasingly technology-
entangled person is more and more challenged, by the growing complexity and 
fragmentation of the person in a postmodern and technology-saturated society.  Whereas 
the person has traditionally been positioned in terms of a binary (human v. nature, human 
v. machine, individual v. group, man v. woman,  non-disabled v. disabled),1 there is a 
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1  This is an approach much criticised by followers of the affirmative model of disability, 
growing recognition that the person is in fact an ‘assemblage’2 – a variably integrated 
collection of physical/physiological, material/mechanical, and virtual/digital elements in 
fluid relation to one another.  
 
Given the above, we (an interdisciplinary group, from law, performance and 
medicine) explore law as it relates to the person as extended or modified by physical 
prosthetics. Our focus is on artificial limbs applied due to an absence caused by congenital 
condition, physical illness or injury, or personal choice.3  Our analysis draws heavily on 
doctrinal legal research, practical medical clinical experiences, and a small but highly 
relevant set of semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The work is grounded in 
‘Identity and Governance of Bodily Extensions: The Case of Prosthetics and Avatars’, an 
interdisciplinary project funded by the Wellcome Trust,4  and also, as will be noted, on 
                                                 
which broadly focuses on what people can do; and indeed by supporters of the social model 
which sees disability as the restrictions imposed on individuals by society through the social 
and physical barriers that characterise common interactions and built environments, rather 
than on how individuals may be ‘impaired’ John Swain and Sally French “Conclusions: 
Some Reflections on Key Questions” in John Swain and French, S. (eds.) Disability on 
Equal Terms (London: Sage, 2008) in contrast to the more traditional medical model of 
disability, which sees disability (which would include the absence of a limb) as a 
physiological and functional problem to be remedied or otherwise managed so that the 
individual can better operate and be accepted in a society not designed for them – see Union 
of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability 
(London: London UPIAS, 1976).  For a critique on how medical law and bioethics has 
engaged with disability, see Alicia Ouellette Bioethics and Disability: Toward a Disability-
Conscious Bioethics (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), and Shawn Harmon “The Invisibility of 
Disability: Using Dance to Shake from Bioethics the Idea of ‘Broken Bodies’” (2015) 29 
Bioethics 488-498; the social model has achieved significant recognition in policy and law-
making, notably the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).  
2  Guattari Deleuze and Felix Guattari (transl. Bruab Massumi) A Thousand Plateaus (London: 
Continuum, 1987). 
3  Elizabeth Wicks The State and the Body: Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy (Oxford: 
Hart, 2016), which, at 107, discusses bodily modification.  Also note the sociological work 
of the late Debra Gimlin: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Debra_Gimlin/publications?pubType=article.  It is with 
affection and respect that Brown expresses deep sadness that she will be unable to continue 
their conversations on this issue. 
4  See http://www.pci.leeds.ac.uk/research/featured-research-projects/identity-and-governance-
of-bodily-extensions-the-case-of-prosthetics-and-avatars/.   In the context of this project, we 
previous empirical research in the disability and digital settings. 
 
Our intent is to uncover the extent to which laws in general, and two specific legal 
regimes in particular – medical devices (“MD”) and intellectual property (“IP”) - are 
sensitive to, or appropriately reflect, the reality of persons who use these particular 
extensions. The first regime was chosen because prosthetics are medical devices, the 
marketing and provision of which typically require regulatory approval with respect to 
quality and safety standard compliance. The second regime was chosen because 
prosthetics or their components can be the results of innovation and creativity; as such IP 
rights (particularly patent, design and copyright) can be obtained, claimed and exercised. 
Technology can also make it increasingly easy to copy the work of others, thus potentially 
infringing IP rights while enhancing personal experiences.5 We argue that these regimes 
have the potential to impact directly on prosthetic development, allocation, and use;  they 
empower or marginalise prosthetic users, a group already long and widely discriminated 
against;6 and they contribute to how prosthetic users are constructed and treated more 
                                                 
have undertaken discursive meetings and user focus groups. Interviewees were selected to 
provide a range of perspectives on limb and avatar usage and design. Interviews were semi 
structured, lasted approximately one hour, were recorded and transcribed with verbal 
recorded consent to quotation in inter alia publications.  3 interviews were carried out with 
amputees (one an artist, runner, advocate and lower limb above knee amputee, one a dancer 
and lower limb above knee amputee and one a computer gamer and cybernet athlete 
paralysed from shoulder downwards. Another interview was held with the director of a 
prosthetic limb manufacturer. The interviewees were all already known to the members of 
the project team and in some cases are involved in the project.  An avatar focus group was 
attended by 8 people, all players with massively multiplayer online games, recruited via 
postings on massively multiplayer online game Facebook groups. The prosthetic user group 
was attended by 3 people, 2 limb users and one carer, recruited via the Seacroft Hospital 
Prosthetics User. Focus groups were semi-structured, lasted 2 hours, were audio recorded 
and transcribed and consent forms were signed at the events.        
5   For example, 3D printing allows individuals to build/print devices in their home with very 
little oversight, and in the process to copy IP-enclosed products: with a focus on technology, 
see Adam Thierer and Adam Marcus “Guns, Limbs, and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing” 
(2016) 17 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 805-854; with a focus on legal 
pathways, see    
6  Paul Abberley “The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of 
broadly in society.   
 
In Section 2, we identify and explore two concepts that, however vague and 
contested they may be, are central to ‘meaning-making’ in the disability and prosthetics 
context, namely ‘identity’ and ‘integrity’.7  These provide a lens through which we can 
examine the law and its adequacy.8  In Section 3, we examine in more depth the extent to 
which the MD and IP frameworks engage with prosthetic limbs. In Section 4, we discuss 
the level of engagement within each of the two legal frameworks to identity and integrity, 
highlighting the other concepts that are favoured. In the MD regulatory and also clinical 
contexts, Section 4.1.1 explores safety, a focus on patients, development and risk; and 
Section 4.1.2 analyses budgets, delivery, and the opportunity for court action. Section 4.2 
explores the IP context, critiquing the impact of IP rights in terms of their existence and 
power. We then argue in Section 4.3 argues that the control and authority which results 
from these legal regimes has inadequate regard to identity and integrity, particularly in 
the light of some empirical conclusions, and proposals for change are made. We conclude 
(in Section 5) that a new, multifaceted approach to the person is warranted. Some initial 
and innovative contributions are made regarding the extent to which the law, through 
these two regimes specifically, could change to empower prosthetic users, facilitate their 
                                                 
Disability” (1987) 2 Disability, Handicap & Society 5-19; Fiona Campbell “Inciting Legal 
Fictions: Disability’s Date with Ontology and the Ableist Body of the Law” (2001) 10 
Griffith Law Review 42-62; Susan Schweik, The Ugly Laws: Disability in Public (NY: NYU 
Press, 2009). 
7  We acknowledge that there may well be other concepts of significance to prosthetic-users, 
but our research highlights these as particularly important, and they potentially have some 
resonance with the frameworks we are exploring. 
8 Note separation discussion in an analysis piece  Shawn H. E. Harmon, Abbe Brown, Sita 
Popat, Sarah Whatley, and Rory O’Connor, "Struggling to be Fit: Identity, Integrity, and the 
Law", (2017) 14:2 SCRIPTed 326 https://script-ed.org/?p=3411 
DOI: 10.2966/scrip.140217.326 regarding the location of these concepts in the broader legal 
landscape offering an overview of the extent to which they are noticed and how they are 
understood.  
capacity to act and engage with society, and engage with the concepts of integrity and 
identity in ways that are positive and enabling. 
 
2. Concepts Important to Meaning-Making in the Prosthetics Context 
 
Meanings are the cognitive categories that make up our view of reality.9  The making or 
taking of meaning is critical to human life, because humans have a natural tendency to 
make meaning out of their experiences, and out of, and for, their lives.10  Indeed it has 
been argued that: 
 
The most fundamental aspect of a human social setting is that of 
meanings.  These are the linguistic categories that make up a 
participant’s view of reality and with which actions are defined.  
Meanings are also referred to by social analysts as culture, norms, 
understandings, social reality, and definitions of the situation, 
typifications, ideology, beliefs, worldview, perspective or stereotypes.  
Terms such as these share a common focus with humanly constructed 
ideas that are consciously singled out as important aspects of reality.  
Meanings are transbehavioral in the sense that they do more than 
describe behavior – they define, justify, and otherwise interpret it as 
well.11 
                                                 
9  Charles Chen “On exploring meanings: Combining humanistic and career psychology 
theories in counselling” (2001) 14 Counselling Psychology Quarterly 317-331. 
10  Viktor Frankl et al Man’s Search For Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963). 
11  Steven Krauss “Research Paradigms and Meaning Making: A Primer” (2005) 10 (4) The 
Qualitative Report 758-770. 
 
While meanings can be broad (e.g., ideologies or philosophies) or narrow (e.g., attached 
to defined aspects of the human existence or a person’s life and experience), they all 
shape narrative identity, or that sense of personal unity and purpose and place which is 
derived from diverse experiences and interactions.12  In short, however broad or narrow, 
or whether derived from human relations or contact with social systems, meanings have 
impacts on the individual.  Moreover, these impacts are often psycho-socially 
significant (i.e., they are important both to disposition and psychological wellbeing, on 
the one hand, and to social reality and standing, on the other). 
 
Previous interdisciplinary research undertaken by the authors in the context of 
elite/professional dance made and performed by disabled dancers suggests that the 
concepts of ‘identity’ (including the potential for a person to have and to choose multiple 
identities) and ‘integrity’ are particularly important for meaning-making in the prosthetics 
setting.13  These concepts are properly, indeed unavoidably, viewed as holding psycho-
social significance for prosthetic users; through their conduct, relationships, experiences, 
and points of contact with the built and social worlds, prosthetic users (indeed all of us) 
give meaning to these concepts. In turn, these concepts influence, for better or for worse, 
our understanding(s) of ourselves and each other, the world, and our place in that world.  
                                                 
12  Jefferson Singer “Narrative Identity and Meaning Making Across the Adult Lifespan: An 
Introduction” (2004) 72 Journal of Personality 437-460. 
13   See the InVisible Difference Project (http://www.invisibledifference.org.uk/), an AHRC-
funded project that sought to extend thinking around the making, status, ownership and value 
of work by contemporary dance choreographers, focusing specifically on that made and 
performed by disabled dance artists; and the Projecting Performance Project, an AHRC-
funded project that examined methods of digital extension to the technical operator’s body in 
theatrical performance contexts: Sita Popat & Scott Palmer, “Embodied Interfaces: Dancing 
with Digital Sprites” (2008) Digital Creativity 19:2, 125-137. 
As such, we consider each briefly below. 
 
As should be apparent from any interaction with the world, ‘identity’ (and 
‘identities’, although for present purpose it will mainly be discussed in the singular) is 
critical to the person. Identity is, however, a contested and multifaceted concept, bearing 
both subjective and objective elements.14  With respect to the former, it is used to describe 
a variety of phenomena, including core personal values and interests, and self-
perceptions.  With respect to the latter, it encompasses public statuses that might be 
assigned at birth or later, and third-party descriptions.  Thus, identities can be constructed 
through individual and fluid narrative practices, or imposed externally and set more 
permanently through formal institutions.15  As such, it has been argued that individuation 
is a process in which individuals express an identity to the extent permitted by those with 
whom they are in communication and partnership; and that we construct our identity in 
large part by learning from, and drawing on, the perspectives of others toward our 
qualities and abilities.16  However, the social entanglement that characterises identity 
renders us vulnerable to ‘disrespect’, which can not only upset our personal narrative, but 
also expose us to physical risk, and so to a loss of our second concept - integrity. 
 
The concept of ‘integrity’ has a strong moral character, and is closely linked to 
                                                 
14  Augusto Blasi and Kimberly Glodis “The Development of Identity: A Critical Analysis from 
the Perspective of the Self as Subject” (1995) 15 Developmental Review 404-433. 
15  Donald Polkinghorne “Explorations of Narrative Identity” (1996) 7 Psychological Inquiry 
363-367; Leonie Huddy “From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social 
Identity Theory” (2001) 22 Political Psychology 127-156.  Regarding specific settings, see 
Ingegard Fagerberg and Mona Kihlgren “Experiencing a Nurse Identity: The Meaning of 
Identity to Swedish Registered Nurses 2 Years After Graduation” (2001) 34 Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 137-145; and more. 
16  Georg Hegel (transl. Michael Petry) Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (Dordrecht: 
Reidel, 1978). 
dignity, which refers to the unity and wellbeing of the person.17  It can be both measured 
against and infringed by various forms of personal insult.  As such, the constitution of 
human integrity (including physical integrity), which is particularly relevant to the 
prosthetics setting because of its links with questions of perceived wholeness, is 
dependent on the experience of ‘intersubjective recognition’ (i.e., it depends on receiving 
approval and respect from others).18 This again links back to identity.  What is not often 
appreciated, is that (physical) integrity can be achieved in the absence of conformity to 
the social norm (i.e., to the normatively constructed whole, or healthy, or idealised body).  
Indeed, physical perfection is often cited as a damaging myth,19 and physical normality 
as a socio-political tool that too often distracts us from the variety and malleability of the 
human form; and from the fact that different forms of embodiment or ways of being can 
be just as exemplary of integrity as others despite their traditional association with non-
wholeness or disability.20  In other words, one can achieve a sense of (physical) integrity 
within a wide array of embodiments that do not comply with the metrics of the normative 
body,21 and so the notion of integrity is potentially an empowering concept. Integrity is 
also critical to the above-mentioned notion of body as assemblage.  It is the integrity or 
unity that defines the assemblage, and sets it apart from just a collection of parts. 22    
                                                 
17  For more on dignity, see Charles Foster Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Oxford: Hart, 
2011). 
18  Axel Honneth “Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality on the 
Theory of Recognition” (1992) 20 Political Theory 187-201. 
19  Roberta Galler “The Myth of the Perfect Body” in Carole Vance (ed.) Pleasure and Danger: 
Exploring Female Sexuality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 165-172. 
20  Nikki Sullivan “Integrity, Mayhem, and the Question of Self-Demand Amputation” (2005) 
19 Continuum: Journal of Media & Culture Studies 325-333. 
21   See Charlotte Waelde, Mathilde Pavis, Karen Wood, Sarah Whatley, Shawn Harmon, Kate 
Marsh, Abbe Brown “A new foundation: physical Integrity, disabled dance and cultural 
heritage” in Sarah Whatley, Charlotte Waelde, Abbe Brown, Shawn Harmon, Karen Wood 
(eds) InVisible Difference: Dance, Disability and Law (Bristol: Intellect, 2018 forthcoming). 
22   Manuel DeLanda A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity 
(London: Continuum, 2006).  DeLanda argues that the whole and the parts exist 
simultaneously on the ontological plane; the properties of the whole are contingent upon the 
relationship of the parts with each other, and to some extent vice-versa, which means that the 
 
Further, the concepts of identity and integrity are linked in both subtle and 
complex, and even inconsistent, ways to the individual’s prosthesis and lived experience.  
This is not only borne out by our own research introduced above, where dancers held 
multiple and situationally-driven feelings toward, and relationships with, their 
prosthesis;23 but also by research involving amputees, which has shown that the use of a 
prosthesis can be associated with the perception of an effective extension of the arm,24 
and by brain-imaging research, which has shown cortical reorganisation on the part of 
amputees after use of assistive tools.25  Neuroscientific studies have also demonstrated 
that, under certain conditions, the brain is able to treat a tool as part of the body.26  
Similarly, research into digital gaming and performance has shown that people readily 
extend their presence and identity into virtual worlds via embodiment of their avatars; 
and that they were enabled and restricted by the technology made available to them, in 
some cases creating new identities27 - which may or may not be bipedal or humanoid. For 
example, the human player might choose a different gender, or to become an animal not 
                                                 
4-limbed, upright, bipedal human norm still strongly shapes the relationship between the 
parts in the assemblage.   
23  For example, some of our participants slipped quite readily back and forth between talking 
about their prosthetic legs as inanimate objects, and as parts of their own bodies.   
24  Paul McDonnell, Robert Scott, et al. “Do artificial limbs become part of the user? New 
evidence” (1989) 26 Journal of Rehabilitation Research and Development 17-24. 
25  Martin Lotze, Wolfgang Grodd, et al. “Does use of a myoelectric prosthesis prevent cortical 
reorganization and phantom limb pain?” (1999) 2 Nature Neuroscience 501-502; Pascal 
Giraux, Angela  Sirigu, et al. “Cortical Reorganization in Motor Cortex after Graft of Both 
Hands” (2001) 4 Nature Neuroscience 691-692; Masaharu Maruishi, Yoshiyuki Tanaka, et 
al. “Brain activation during manipulation of the myoelectric prosthetic hand: A functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study” (2004) 21 NeuroImage 1604-1611. 
26  See Atsushi Iriki, Michio Tanaka, et al.“Coding of Modified Body Schema During Tool Use 
by Macaque Postcentral Neurons” (1996) 7 NeuroReport 2325-2330, and Angelo Maravita 
and Atsushi Iriki “Tools for the Body (Schema)” (2004) 8 Trends Cognitive Science 79-86. 
27  Angela Adrian Law and Order in Virtual Worlds: Exploring Avatars, their ownership and 
rights (Hershey: Information Science Reference, 2010) 33-88; and Tracy Spaight “Who 
Killed Miss Norway” and Susan Crawford “Who’s in Charge of Who I Am? Identity and 
Law Online” both in Jack Balkin (ed) The State of Play: Law and Virtual Worlds (New 
York: New York University Press, 2006) 189-216.  
found in real world nature and/or to have new traits, such as the ability to fly.28  
 
All told, it would seem that body representation, which is critical to identity 
formation, is plastic, capable of incorporating salient external objects, tools and assistive 
devices.29  The reason or objective for the prosthesis (as rehabilitative or functional 
replacement, as tool, as aesthetic addition through choice, or as something else), together 
with other external factors (like its appearance, capabilities, or who controls it and how) 
may also influence how the prosthesis is perceived within the bodily assemblage.  These 
can give rise to a greater sense of embeddedness and ownership, thereby undermining 
characterisations of ‘artificiality’.30 Parenthetically, the objectives associated with it (as 
tool, replacement, or other) may also (or ought to) have different implications for the 
                                                 
28  Jaime Banks “Object, Me, Symbiote, Other: A Social Typology of Player-Avatar 
Relationships”     (2015) 20 First Monday 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5433/4208 (last accessed 13 September 
2017), and Sita Popat “Missing in Action: Embodied Experience and Virtual Reality” (2016) 68 
Theatre Journal 357-378; Julia Shaw “From homo economicus to homo roboticus: an 
exploration of the transformative impact of the technological imagery” (2015) International 
Journal of Law in Context 245-263; Jack Balkin “Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and 
Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds”   2004 90 (8) Virginia Law Review 2043-2098;  Greg 
Lastowka “Virtual Justice: the New Laws of Online Worlds” (New Haven:Yale University 
Press, 2012 (Paperback)) 35 et seq, discussing development of avatars and gaming, 45 et seq; 
Woodrow Barfield “Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the 
Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars” 2006 39 Akron Law Review 649-700;  
Woodrow Barfield "The Law of Looks and Artificial Bodies" in Woodrow Barfield Cyber-
Humans: Our Future with Machines (Gottingen: Copernicus, 2015) 215-266; Edward 
Castronova “Theory of the Avatar” (2003) CESifo Working Paper 863 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=385103 (last accessed 13 September 2017).  
29  Angelo Maravita, Charles Spence et al. “Driver Tool-Use Changes Multimodal Spatial 
Interactions between Vision and Touch in Normal Humans” (2002) 83 Cognition B25-B34; 
James Lewis “Cortical Networks Related to Human Use of Tools” (2006) 12 Neuroscientist 
211-231; Alessandro Farne, Andrea Serino et al. “Dynamic size-change of peri-hand space 
following tool-use: Determinants and spatial characteristics revealed through cross-modal 
extinction” (2007) 43 Cortex 436-443; and Oyvind Standal “Re-embodiment: Incorporation 
through Embodied Learning of Wheelchair Skills” (2011) 14 Medical, Health Care and 
Philosophy 177-184. 
30  Keisuke Suzuki, Sarah Garfinkel, et al “Multisensory integration across exteroceptive and 
interoceptive domains modulates self-experience in the rubber-hand illusion” (2013) 1 
Neuropsychologia 2909-2917; Jane Aspell, Lukas Heydrich, et al. “Turning body and self 
inside out: Visualized heartbeats alter bodily self-consciousness and tactile perception” 
(2013) 24 Psychological Science 2445-2453. 
design and functional parameters of the prosthesis.31 
 
In summary, identity is shaped in part by physiology.  And while society imposes 
bipedal uprightness as the physical norm and creates social and environmental pressures 
to conform,32 prosthetic users can nonetheless achieve a sense of physical integrity 
regardless of the particulars of their embodiment.  They may feel whole and internally 
harmonious despite their divergence from the ‘normal’ parameters of wholeness and 
idealised embodiment which may be imposed by society.  Further, the users’ identity and 
sense of integrity will almost certainly be influenced by the prosthesis; and so, even if a 
prosthesis is developed in, and designed for, the rehabilitative setting, their 
characterisation as a rehabilitative tool or mere functional replacement may not be 
appropriate.33  The prosthesis may be additionally desired for its constitutive function and 
its influence on individuation.  Indeed, the prosthesis might be inculcated into the 
individual’s personal narrative such that one’s sense of ‘ownership’ over it (not 
necessarily in a legal sense) might be comparable to that of the usual physiological body 
part it is meant to replace.  Given the above, it seems clear that how key specific legal 
frameworks approach both these core meaning-making concepts, and prosthetics more 
specifically, is important. 
                                                 
31  Luke Miller, Matthew Longo, et al. “Tool Morphology Constrains the Effects of Tool Use 
on Body Representations” (2014) 40 Journal of Experimental Psychology:Human 
Perception and Perform 2143-2153. 
32  Sharon Betcher “Putting my Foot (Prosthesis, Crutches, Phantom) Down: Considering 
Technology as Transcendence in the Writings of Donna Harraway” (2001) Women’s Studies 
Quarterly 29(3/4) 35-53. 
33 Donna Reeve “Cyborgs, Cripples and iCrip: Reflections on the Contribution of Haraway to 
Disability Studies” in Dan Goodley et al (eds.) Disability and Social Theory: New Developments 
and Directions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 91-111, which notes that technology is 
frequently overly associated with normalisation, rehabilitation, and cure; see also Dan Goodley 
Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach (London: Sage, 2011); and Margaret Quinlan 
and Benjamin Bates “Bionic Woman (2007): Gender, Disability and Cyborgs” (2009) (1) Journal 




3 Legal  Frameworks and their approaches to prosthetics  
 
So informed, we are now equipped to explore in greater depth the principles and the 
rules of the two legal frameworks (MD and IP) in an effort to evaluate their worldview.  
This discussion could sit alongside a broader system of laws and norms such as property 
law34 and contract law35 (both of which engage with ownership of the physical 
prosthesis), information control law (which engages with the structure and use of the 
prosthesis),36 tax law (which engages with status)37 and how well the law respects and 
facilitates our diversity, notably through human rights.38 However, these issues must lie 
                                                 
34 See eg European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1951) Protocol 1 
art 1 ECHR; Caterina Sganga “Cracking the citadel walls: a functional approach to 
cosmopolitan models within and beyond national property regimes” (2014) Cambridge Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 770-794, from 776; Neil A Silberman “From Cultural 
Property to Cultural Data: The Multiple Dimensions of “Ownerships” in a Global Digital Age” 
(2014) 21(3) International Journal of Cultural Property 365-374; Andrew Murray Information 
Technology Law: The Law and Society (Oxford: OUP, 3rd ed 2016) 91-109; Joshua Fairfield 
“Virtual Property” 2005 85 (4)  Boston University Law Review 1047-1102.  
35 Lee Bygrave “Contract vs statute in internet governance” in Ian Brown (ed) Research 
Handbook on Governance of the Internet (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 168-197 raises 
interesting questions on forms of regulation, flexibility and power imbalances. 
36 UK Data Protection Act 1998, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data OJ L 119 4 May 2016 1-
88 (General Data Protection Regulation). 
37  Amoena (UK) Ltd v The Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2011] UKFTT 675 
(TC) regarding a mastectomy bra; this discusses mass production, individual need, 
substitutability for the body - rather than disability. 
38  For more on the role of law in recognising and normalising diversity, see Sarah Whatley, 
Charlotte Waelde et al. “Validation and Virtuosity: Perspectives on Difference and 
Authorship/Control in Dance” (2015) 6 Choreographic Practices 59-83, and Shawn 
Harmon, Hannah Donaldson et al. “Disability and the Dancing Body: A Symposium on 
Ownership, Identity and Difference in Dance” (2015) 12 SCRIPTed 59-69 https://script-
ed.org/article/disability-and-the-dancing-body-a-symposium-on-ownership-identity-and-difference-in-
outside the scope of this paper. As a preliminary point, we will explore the extent to 
which the frameworks explicitly recognise prosthetics as within their remit. This may 
impact on how cognisant they are of the particularities of the prosthetics environment.  
 
The MD regime will be explored on the basis of a 2017 EU Regulation of 2017 
that will come into effect in 2020.39 It preserves many of the key features of the existing 
regime, and once in force, must be applied in its entirety across the EU - as with so many 
issues, the approach to be taken in the UK after Brexit remains to be seen. The EU 
Regulation defines a ‘medical device’ as any instrument, apparatus, appliance, implant or 
other article intended by the manufacturer to be used, alone or in combination, for human 
beings for one or more of a number of specific medical purposes - one of which is the 
‘replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological or pathological process 
or state’.40  Such devices can only be ‘placed on the market or put into service’ if they 
comply with the EU Regulation, and are supplied and properly installed, maintained, and 
used in accordance with their intended purpose.41 In short, a wide range of artefacts are 
captured, including prosthetics. Their availability is contingent on compliance with the 
regime established. 
 
In contrast, IP laws focus on whether the requirements are met for a right to exist, 
                                                 
dance/ (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
39  Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on 
medical devices OJ L 117 5 May 2017 1-175.  This builds on  Document 2012/0266 (COD), 
22 February 2017, which represents the final text of the new Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Medical Devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, 
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009, and repealing Council 
Directives 90/385/ and 93/42/EEC.  See https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/medical-
devices/regulatory-framework_en (last accessed 13 September 2017) (EU Regulation).   
40  EU Regulation (n5), art 2.1(1). 
41  EU Regulation (n5), art 5.1. 
rather on the uses of the underlying subject matter.  IP law is found in national42 and EU43 
law (again for the UK there is the Brexit uncertainty), under the umbrella of international 
treaties like the TRIPS Agreement,44 within the World Trade Organisation.45  For an IP 
right to exist, there needs to be an invention, the non-functional appearance of a product 
or an original piece of work which meets the thresholds for (respectively), the patent, 
design, or copyright to exist. For patents, the invention needs to be new and also inventive 
as compared to common general knowledge.46 For registered design, the appearance 
needs to be new and of individual character, with the overall impression on the informed 
user differing from the overall impression of others.47 For a UK unregistered design the 
shape or configuration of whole or part of the article is not to be common place.48 For 
copyright (which is also an unregistered right) the works needs to be original in the sense 
of not being copied from the work of another,49 and to come within a relevant category – 
key examples relevant here are literary works for drawings,50 sculptures and graphic work 
irrespective of artistic quality51 and works of artistic craftsmanship.52 There are 
                                                 
42  Eg UK Patents Act 1977, UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, UK Registered 
Designs Act 1949.   
43  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2002/6 of 12 December 2001 on community designs OJ L 3 5 
January 2002, 1-24 (Community Design Regulation);   Directive 98/71 on the legal 
protection of designs OJ L 289 28 October 1998 28-35; Directive 98/44 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions OJ L 213 30 July 1998. 
44  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1 C to the WTO 
Agreement (TRIPS) 
45  See WTO website https://www.wto.org (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
46  Patents Act 1977, ss1-3. 
47  Registered Designs Act 1949, ss1(2), 1B(1) and (3), 1C and Community Design Regulation 
(n7), arts 4, 5, 6.   
48  Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s213(4);  but it  not need to be novel, see Amoena  
v Trulife [1995] 12 D-346 
49  University of London Press v University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch 601, note also Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2009] ECDR 26 regarding 
possible  shift to intellectual creation  
50 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s1(1)(a).  
51 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s4(1)(a). 
52  Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s4(1)(c). 
differences in the forms of protection which are conferred by each right. Broadly, the 
patent53 and registered design54 tests focus on the similarity between products and the 
scope of the IP right, even if they were independently created. In contrast copyright 
requires, as the name suggests, copying in a 2D or 3D form, although this can be indirect55 
(e.g. the person may have forgotten that they saw an existing product which they then 
build – this raises obvious problems of evidence). 
 
It should be stressed that in contrast with the position in respect of EU 
Regulation, it is possible for prosthetics to exist without IP. Further, IP rights regarding, 
say, control of the shape or function of a prosthetic leg, are quite distinct from the 
ownership of a particular physical prosthetic leg. Where there is a relevant IP right, 
however, the owner of the IP right will have the power to influence use of the prosthesis 
made, exactly or similarly, in 2 or 3 D form, to that particular shape or function.56  
Accordingly, and as is considered further below, the IP owner could forbid the use of a 
prosthesis without their permission even if the MD regime, the prosthetic user, and the 
clinical team would like this to be done. And as prosthetics are being further developed 
and directly sourced by suppliers complementing traditional medical public hospital 
based structures, (for example by Touch Bionics57 and the Alternative Limb Project),58 
                                                 
53  Patents Act 1977, s 125 (1) referring to European Patent Convention, art 69 and Protocol; 
Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel [2005] 1 All ER 667 and Actavis UK Ltd v Eli Lilly 
& Co [2017] UKSC 48. 
54  Registered Designs Act 1949, s 7(1), Magmatic Ltd v PMS International Group Plc [2016] 
UKSC 12.  
55  Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 16.  
56 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 17(3). 
57 See Touch Bionics website http://www.touchbionics.com/ (last accessed 13 September 2017).  
58  See website http://www.thealternativelimbproject.com (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
there is the prospect of private control through the power of IP being more visible, 
rather than hidden behind medical walls.  
 
IP can indeed be relevant to the outputs of all manufacturers and makers. In 
addition to the growth of private entities, there are community maker voluntary 
initiatives such as Knitted Knockers for homemade breast prostheses.59 It will be 
interesting to monitor the impact of these activities and their attitudes toward IP. 
Unregistered design and copyright will as seen arise automatically if the thresholds are 
met, and it is quite possible that the other forms of IP protection will also be sought; 
whether or not all manufacturers and makers then choose to rely on IP rights to prevent 
activity by others is their choice. There are examples of this not being done, with 
patents not being sought and relevant information being made available, to enable the 
prostheses to be reproduced more readily - including through 3D printing60 (which was 
introduced above from its opposite perspective, as providing a new opportunity for 
infringement).61  Yet although makers may be open to their work being reproduced by 
                                                 
59   See website https://www.knittedknockers.org (last accessed 13 September 2017); Donna Reeve 
and Richard Sewell “The rise of the Maker Movement and open source prosthetics: An 
example of Braidotti’s ‘critical posthuman subject’” paper presented at Theorizing Normalcy 
and the Mundane, 5th International Conference, Sheffield University, 7-8 July 2014 
http://donnareeve.co.uk/?tag=maker-movement (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
60  For discussion of collaboration, and lessons which can be learnt from the software 
community in this respect, and drawing on empirical work, see Rosa Maria Ballardini, Juho 
Lindman and Flores Ituarte “Co-creation, commercialization and intellectual property – 
challenges with 3D printing” (2016) 7(3) European Journal of Law and Technology Internet;  
Dinusha Mendis “’The clone wars’ – episode 1 – the rise of 3D printing and its implications 
for intellectual property law – learning lessons from the past?’ 2013 35(3) European 
Intellectual Property Review 155-169 and Dinusha Mendis “Clone Wars Episode II – The 
Next Generation: The Copyright Implications Relating to 3D Printing and Computer-Aided 
Design (CAD) Files” 2014 6(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 265-281.     
61 See e-NABLE project which focuses on 3D printing prosthetic hands 
http://enablingthefuture.org/about/ (last accessed 13 September 2017), and “Engineer creates a 
3D exoskeleton ‘Spider hand’ for stroke victims’http://www.3ders.org/articles/20150728-
engineer-creates-a-3d-printed-exoskeleton-spiderhand-for-stroke-victims.html (last accessed 13 
September 2017). 
some,62 what about this being done by a large company seeking to charge high (or any) 
fees? 
 
The next Section explores the application of the two legal frameworks and their 
principles on and for prosthetic users and our two core concepts. Throughout, common 
threads and concerns will be firstly, the holding and exercise of power through 
development decisions regarding function and aesthetics; and secondly, the control of 
allocation and limiting of opportunity and choice in different ways. It will be seen that 
these powers are held by various actors, invariably excluding the prosthesis users 
themselves on the basis of their own perspectives and priorities. 
 
4 Sensitivity and alignment of the legal frameworks to identity and integrity 
 
4.1 The Medical Devices Perspective 
 
4.1.1 Development and risk  
 
The MD framework addresses a dizzying array of artefacts, from tongue depressors, to 
scalpels, to arterial stents, to imaging machines and monitors, to implantable cardioverter-
defibrillators, and more.  Further, although the regulatory framework has direct 
                                                 
62 See “Library Used its 3D Printer to Make Prosthetic Hand for Girl” 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/texas-library-3d-printer-prosthetic-limb-girl-katelyn-
vincik_us_57bdc30ae4b0287a6e7312c0 (last accessed 13 September 2017); Daniel McGlynn 
“Young makers build prosthetic hands for children in need” 
http://engineering.berkeley.edu/2016/07/young-makers-build-prosthetic-hands-children-need 
(last accessed 13 September 2017); Rachel Katz “High Schoolers make 9 year old a prosthetic 
hand for less than $10” http://abcnews.go.com/Health/high-schoolers-make-year-prosthetic-
hand-10/story?id=23521043 (last accessed 13 September 2017).  
application to prosthetics, it takes little specific notice of the nature of the prostheses, or 
of their impact. The EU Regulation includes ‘modification’, which can be argued to cover 
‘extensions of the body’. The framework as a whole appears, however, to view prostheses 
entirely from a medical perspective, and as having a purely curative or condition-
management character.63 The regime fails to engage, therefore, with our notions of 
identity and integrity as multifaceted constitutive phenomena. There are separate 
regulations for medical and cosmetic devices,64 although the EU Regulation notes that 
the distinction is unclear, and it calls for further action in this respect.65  Further, the 
narrow approach to regulation and the prosthesis is taken notwithstanding the standard 
recital reference to the EU Charter rights - and in this case to dignity, freedom of art and 
integrity of the person.66    
 
 
Rather, at the heart of the MD framework are the substantive principles of ‘safety’, 
‘risk’, and ‘performance’, together with operational principles of ‘transparency’ and 
‘proportionality’.67 The ‘worldview’ of the EU Regulation is argued to be summed up in 
its instructions that devices must achieve the performance intended by the manufacturer; 
and also that devices must be designed and manufactured in such a way that, during 
normal use, they are suitable for their intended purpose – meaning they must be safe and 
effective, and not compromise the clinical condition or the safety of patients, or the safety 
                                                 
63  See again the definition: EU Regulation (n5), art 2.1(1). 
64  Regulation (EC) 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council on Cosmetic 
Products OJ L 342 22 December 2009 59.   
65   EU Regulation (n5), recital 9 and art 1.6.   
66   EU Regulation (n5), recital 89.   
67  These principles must be read against the imperatives to get products to market quickly and 
efficiently, and to facilitate the single market: EU Regulation (n5), recitals 
1,4,30,31,32,43,44,53,74,87,88,101 and arts 10, 22, 27, 30, 56, 83, 95, 97, 106, 113. 
and health of users or, where applicable, other persons.68  
 
With respect to safety, devices are categorised by class, taking into account the 
purpose of the device as intended by the manufacturer, and the inherent risks of the 
device,69 with criteria for each class set out in the EU Regulation.70  The EU Regulation 
proceeds from an acceptance that absolute safety cannot be achieved, so every device and 
every act of classification is a matter of risk assessment and risk notification, with risk 
highlighted everywhere.71  A central aim is to minimise the likelihood and consequences 
of an adverse or harm-causing event, which are approached in the context of medicine 
and functionality - quite distinct from the points discussed in respect of identity and 
integrity.  Manufacturers must establish and maintain an iterative risk management 
system applicable to the lifecycle of a device, and must select solutions that result in only 
“acceptable risks”.72  Further, devices must be designed and manufactured in such a way 
as to reduce as far as possible risks posed by the unintentional ingress of substances into 
the device, taking into account the following: the device and the nature of the environment 
in which it is intended to be used;73 their physical (i.e., ergonomic) features of the device 
or external or environmental conditions (i.e., pressure, humidity, temperature, 
                                                 
68  EU Regulation (n5), art 95, 106 (regarding expertise), art I.1 of Annex I, Annex XIV. 
69  EU Regulation (n5), art 2.12, 32, 47, 52, 54, 55.  
70  See EU Regulation (n5), Annex VIII. For a discussion of some of the then proposed new 
rules in this respect, see Crom Source White Paper. Changes to EU Medical Device 
Legislation: What you Need to Know (June 2016) at https://www.cromsource.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Changes-to-EU-Medical-Device-legislation-What-you-need-to-know-White-
paper-2016.pdf. Note the prospect of these decisions being open to judicial challenge (also 
discussed more generally below) – for Scottish example under previous regime see Hyaltech 
Ltd (Petitioners) [2008] CSIH 64.    
71  Many of the specifications relating to labelling and instructions deal with safety and risk: EU 
Regulation (n5) Chapter 1 of Annex I.  
72  EU Regulation (n5), art 1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.9. 
73  EU Regulation (n5), art 10.5 of Annex I. 
acceleration);74 and mechanical features such as movement, vibration, noise and heat.75 
 
Within this, factors impacting on risk include degree of invasiveness, duration of 
contact, and body system affected.76  One can see within this structure that, for the most 
part, it is manufacturers who set the parameters for performance, normal use, safety, and 
efficacy, and who undertake the primary risk assessments and design decisions.77 The 
manufacturer will put together a comprehensive dossier with a range of technical 
evidence determined by the class that the manufacturer considers the device to be within, 
and this is then submitted to the relevant national Notified Body for assessment and 
authorisation.78  Manufacturers are additionally responsible for ensuring traceability of 
the device, and follow-up of adverse events.79   
                                                 
74  EU Regulation (n5), article 4(a), 7, 14.2(b), Annex I.  
75  EU Regulation (n5), art 18.5, 19.1, 20.1, 20.2, Annex I.  
76  EU Regulation (n5), Annex VIII.  
77  Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, technical standards and specifications were written into 
regulatory directives.  Post-1990s, and largely preserved in the EU Regulation (n5), a 
separation between law and technical standards was adopted (see e.g. arts 8, 9, 
71).Generally, the law relies on essential requirements, as opposed to bespoke technical 
standards, and the CE mark that is awarded serves as a market entrance authorization, not a 
rigorous premarket approval of individual products relying on strict product-testing such as 
in the pharmaceutical sector: Christa Altenstetter “EU and Member State Medical Devices 
Regulation” (2003) 19 International Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care 228-
248. 
78  For a good articulation of the previous regulation and the manufacturer’s responsibilities and 
the approval process in the context of a product liability case based on failure of an 
implanted prosthetic, see Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd. [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB). 
79  In contrast, traceability and post-market surveillance of devices are addressed in Chapters III 
and VII respectively of the EU Regulation, and both areas have seen substantial changes.  
This is in keeping with the strengthening of surveillance in the USA, where the Safe Medical 
Devices Act 1990 and the Medical Device Amendments 1992 required healthcare facilities 
to track the use of certain high-risk devices, and to report to the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) any device-related (serious) injuries or deaths.  The FDA 
subsequently received numerous adverse event reports, including some 160,487 in 2004 
alone, with most coming from manufacturers: William Maisel “Safety Issues Involving 
Medical Devices: Implications of Recent Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator 
Malfunctions” (2005) 294 Journal of the American Medical Association 955-958.  See also 
Frederic Resnic and Sharonlise Normand “Postmarketing Surveillance of Medical Devices—
Filling in the Gaps” (2012) 266 New England Journal of Medicine 875-877. 
 
The EU Regulation also provides that any risks which may be associated with 
use of a device must be evaluated against the benefits to the patient, and the need to 
achieve a high level of protection of health and safety, taking into account the state of 
the art.80 The word choice – “patient” - is revealing, although not unexpected given the 
medical and functional focus noted so far. Thus while this particular provision could 
provide scope for the opinions and assessment of the individual device user,81 present 
indications are that this is not coming about.  Indeed, whilst much current research on 
device development in the UK is funded through the National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR),82 and patient and public involvement is a prerequisite for NIHR 
funding,83 much of the existing technology in the healthcare market has not had any 
prosthetic user engagement in its development other than some involvement of users as 
recipients of the ultimate product. 
 
Consistent with its worldview discussed above, the EU Regulation states that 
devices shall be designed and manufactured in such a way that they perform appropriately 
for their intended purpose taking into account the skills and the means available to 
                                                 
80  EU Regulation (n5) art I.1 of Annex I; and proportionality is meant to inform this calculus: 
EU Regulation (n5) art 10.9.  Related to safety and risk, manufacturers must establish and 
maintain a quality management system and an iterative risk management system applicable 
to the lifecycle of a device, and must select solutions that result in only acceptable risks: EU 
Regulation (n5), art 1.3, 5.5 and art 1 of Annex I. 
81  Indeed, references to ‘users’ usually means healthcare professionals: WHO, Medical Device 
Regulations: Global Overview and Guiding Principles (Geneva: WHO, 2003). 
82  See National Institute for Health Research website https://www.nihr.ac.uk (last accessed 13 
September 2017), contributions made by eg Chief Scientist Office in Scotland 
http://www.cso.scot.nhs.uk/funding-2/ (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
83 And see eg NIHR “Patients and the public” webpage https://www.nihr.ac.uk/patients-and-public/ 
(last accessed 13 September 2017). 
laypersons, and the influence resulting from variation that can reasonably be anticipated 
in the layperson’s technique and environment.  Rather like the reference to the “patient” 
above, this could provide a base for a deep interrogation of “environment” drawing on 
our two core concepts. The main requirements for action in this respect, however, involve 
information: instructions provided by the manufacturer shall be easy for the lay person to 
understand and apply,84 and labels are not to contain false or misleading information 
about the device’s purpose, use, or performance.85  So again, the user is viewed as a 
passive beneficiary and involvement of lay persons to any extent is not mandated. This is 
particularly interesting in the context of “repairs”.  A prosthetic limb might need repair 
or replacement, not least because of natural degradation and development of the rest of 
the body.   Decisions in this respect, however, are much more (or wholly) under the 
control of the prescriber of the prosthesis than the user.86  
 
This regulatory regime, at its extremes, can lead to the non-user having the power 
(and the responsibility) to make decisions about functionality without any regard to the 
aspirations of the user, or indeed regarding aesthetics.   This will have an impact on 
identity - one which is so far unexplored in the existing discussion of bodily autonomy.87  
And it is perhaps as a result of this marginalisation (with respect to design, function, 
performance, and many other relevant details) that more informal maker movements have 
arisen, such as those discussed above. The EU Regulation can apply to any prosthesis, 
howsoever developed, but devices manufactured and used within health institutions are 
                                                 
84  EU Regulation (n5), arts 18.1  and 22.1 of Annex I.  
85  EU Regulation (n5), art 7, 
86  Kate Sansam, Rory O’Connor et al “Clinician’s perspectives on decision making in lower 
limb amputee rehabilitation” 2014 46(5) Journal of Rehabilitation Medicine 447-53. 
87  Note focus on abortion and euthanasia, eg Wicks (n3) 1 et seq.  
considered as being ‘put into service’.88 They are therefore exempt from many 
requirements of the EU Regulation, although they must still comply with general safety 
and performance requirements.89 Nonetheless, given this reality, it is important to 
consider how devices are delivered to people, which means considering their provision 
within the UK’s National Health Service (“NHS”).    
 
 
4.1.2 Delivery of prosthetics: practical, financial and judicial  
 
There are 44 centres in the UK as a whole which provide prosthetic services.90 
Each centre provides a service for the surrounding population as defined by the 
commissioning arrangements that operate in each of the countries in the UK.91 These 
centres run very similar programmes and offer a range of prostheses based on nationally 
agreed guidelines, although some services, such as children’s prosthetics, are only 
available from the larger, more specialised centres.92 Most centres adopt a 
multidisciplinary team approach, with a rehabilitation physician, physiotherapist, 
occupational therapist, psychologist, and prosthetist all available to the prosthetic user, 
depending on their needs.  
                                                 
88  EU Regulation (n5), article 5.4; such devices cannot be transferred to another legal entity: 
Article 5.5a EU Regulation. 
89  EU Regulation (n5), article 5. 
90  National Amputee Statistical Database for the UK (2005) see http://limbless-statistics.org/-----
NASDAB-----.php (last accessed 13 September 2017). 
91   See e.g. for English and Wales “NHS Commissioning” 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/  and for Scotland “Procurement, 
Commissioning and Facilities” https://nhsnss.org/how-nss-works/our-structure/procurement-
commissioning-and-facilities/ (both last accessed 13 September 2017). 
92   British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine “Amputee and Prosthetic Rehabilitation – 
Standards and Guidelines (2ed) 2003 http://www.bsrm.org.uk/downloads/ars-gfinaltext.pdf (last 
accessed 13 September 2017). 
 
Taking the NHS in England and Wales as an example, patients are referred to a 
prosthetic limb fitting centre by a clinician, generally a physiotherapist, or the surgeon 
who performed the amputation.93 At the prosthetics centre, the first assessment is whether 
the patient is suitable for a prosthesis – many patients are frail or may not have walked 
for a considerable period of time due to another medical condition, such as heart disease. 
After an initial trial in the centre with a highly adjustable generic prosthesis, the decision 
to proceed to manufacturing a prosthesis is made. This matches the shape of the residual 
limb (the “stump”), accommodating any wounds or scars on the skin, and is designed to 
take the forces through it commensurate to the use of the limb – in this case walking or 
activities involving the arm. The limb will comprise the socket (the interface between the 
user’s skin and the prosthesis – generally a rigid polypropylene shell), limb components 
(flexible joints, shock absorbers) and a cover (foam, nylon, silicone) that provides the 
cosmesis.   
 
The decision on the exact composition of the limb is reached by the team in the 
centre in consultation with the prosthetic user. Whilst a person with a newly acquired 
amputation would only rarely be familiar with prosthetic technology, their opinions on 
the appearance of the prosthesis and the required functions would be taken into account 
when formulating the prescription. These would, of course, be tempered by the 
knowledge and experience of the clinical team.94 The specifics of this “prescription” 
                                                 
93  Account provided by O’Connor, expert in this field and Charterhouse Professor of 
Rehabilitation Medicine, University of Leeds and Honorary Consultant Physician in 
Rehabilitation Medicines at Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trusts    
94   See also discussion of the process and the different roles played in a tax case General 
Healthcare Group Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs [2014] 
UKFTT 1087 (TC) and on appeal [2016] UKUT 315 (TCC). 
will change over time depending on the evolving needs of the user. Minor repairs or 
modifications can be performed in a day at the centre, but more extensive alterations 
will require a new prescription and the manufacture of a new limb. Critically, the NHS 
and the private sector can often come together. Each centre is associated with one of the 
major manufacturers and their products will be the preferred starting components for the 
service. Prosthetic users should, however, be offered the most appropriate components 
for their needs, irrespective of whether the manufacturer linked to the centre supplies 
that component.  
 
From the above, it should be clear that the question of “need” is central. Its 
meaning, however, is not at all clearly or consistently understood, and uncertainty 
persists with respect to how it is or sought to be applied given current legal framework 
and the prevailing resource context. At the time of writing (2017-18), a user’s desire to 
have a limb that enables them to pursue a specific activity (e.g. swimming) will be 
problematic, as this will not normally be deemed a ‘health need’.  Interestingly, 
experiences in this respect will vary, as our interviews and focus group meetings with 
prosthetic users95 indicate. Our evidence suggests that firstly some users are more 
proactive and engaged than others; secondly, some users (typically those with more 
education, greater language skills and experience that lead to recognition of expertise 
such as dancers and athletes), are likely to have more regard paid to their interests and 
opinion; and thirdly, some teams are more open to users as development partners than 
others.  All of this means that experiences within the NHS will not be uniform. 
                                                 
95 See note 4 regarding method. 
Nonetheless, a strong theme from all users is that they would like greater regard to be 
had to their interests.     
 
The above raises a further issue, namely that of funding. As with other 
healthcare services in the UK, a small number of individuals choose to purchase a 
prosthesis and the associated service from a private provider (such as those discussed 
above). In some cases this may be funded by an insurance company if the amputation 
was related to, say, a motor vehicle collision. Within the NHS, as with other NHS 
services, provision of prosthetics is free at the point of service. Actors within the NHS 
will have to make difficult funding decisions and guidelines are issued from time to 
time in this respect. As an example, the NHS 2016 Funding Guidelines for England 
provide that prosthetics for lower limb loss are likely to be routinely funded.96  Of 
course, there is scope for legal challenge to funding decisions by public bodies (such as 
prosthetic centres) through the process of judicial review,97 provided the applicant has 
sufficient interest in the matter,98 and resources to pursue it. The challenge will need to 
be on the basis, broadly, that the decision is irrational and follows unfair or unlawful 
policies or that proper process has not been followed - rather than raising any questions 
of substance. Decision in cases involving the funding of cancer treatments99 and of 
breast augmentation for transsexuals100 demonstrate how difficult it can be to achieve 
                                                 
96  See NHS England “NHS England announces provisional investment decisions for specialised 
services (11 July 2016) https://www.england.nhs.uk/2016/07/spec-services-investment/ (last 
accessed 13 September 2017). This is subject, in a reminder of the limited resource, to 
decisions regarding HIV funding.   
97  See eg Association Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223. 
98  English approach – see section 31(3) Senior Courts Act 1981 – includes a requirement of 
obtaining the consent of the court.  
99  R (on app Rogers) v Swindon NHS PCT 2006 EWHC Civ 392, [2006] 1 WLR 2649. 
100  R (app C) v Berkshire West PCT [2010] A.C.D. 75, 2020 EWHC 1162 (Admin). 
success in the judicial review process. Even if success is achieved, this means that the 
original decision maker will have to reconsider of the decision on the different bases, 
not that they will necessarily arrive at a different substantive result.    
 
This discussion of judicial review raises two further points. Firstly, as the cancer 
treatment case made clear, the primary care trust policy can provide that there could be 
exceptional circumstances, with funding able to go beyond what is in the policies.  This 
was to be assessed, however, on the basis of legitimate clinical needs, not on personal 
characteristics or desires falling outside clinical care needs. This reiterates the themes 
identified above with respect to the perspectives which are privileged in MD regulation, 
and it further entrenches the non-user centric approach seen above to be adopted in 
practice. It is therefore another worrying confirmation that law and regulation 
applicable to prosthetics do not engage with the user or with the core concepts of 
integrity and identity. Secondly, judicial review has its limits. The fact that, say, a 
prosthetic user is unable, through whatever means, to afford a creative and frankly 
fabulous graphite and jewelled leg supplied directly by the Alternative Limb Project 
could not lead to a challenge on this basis. From the perspective of public law and 
limited budgets this might seem appropriate; when viewed through the lens of 
perceptions of self and opportunities for expression and actualization (and their link to 
wellbeing), a different position is argued to emerge.    
 
In summary, it is the manufacturer, the clinician and other health professionals 
who are expected to make most decisions, and they are expected to act in advancement 
of medical principles and sensibilities, and in compliance with the EU Regulation and 
other guidelines and restrictions. There is no sense of acknowledgement from the legal, 
regulatory, or funding perspective that a device (here the prosthesis) may be important to 
the individual’s identity. Indeed, this concept is hardly implicated formally other than 
through the framework’s attention to performance and risk, although speak indirectly to 
integrity. All matters and parameters are informed by the manufacturer and medical 
perspectives, and all risk assessments and measures are tailored to those (often conjoined) 
ideals.  There is no direction that these standards must have any relevance to the lived 
experience of the user. A rather different silence and disengagement can be found when 
one explores the impact of IP law on identity and integrity for prosthetics users.   
 
4.2 The IP perspective 
 
In addition to the basic thresholds to be met for IP rights to exist, there are some more 
specific provisions which may be relevant to prosthetics. Firstly, there is controversy as 
to when a software-related innovation can be the subject of a patent101 (bearing in mind 
that it can always be the subject of copyright, although this has the more limited form of 
protection, as discussed above).   This restriction could be relevant to software 
innovation relating to the preparation of prosthetics and the gathering of data sets which 
enable prostheses to be prepared for individual users based on accumulated data from 
other users.  It is also interesting to note, given discussion regarding the extent to which 
prostheses may be viewed by users as part of the body, that EU and the resulting UK 
legislation limits the patenting of biotechnological innovation, notably those which 
                                                 
101 European Patent Convention, art 52(2) and (3); and Patents Act 1977, s 1(2); Programs for 
Computers Case G03/08 (Enlarged Board of Appeal) [2010] EP0R 36; Symbian Ltd v 
Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks [2008] EWCA Civ 1066.   
involve the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes.102 This area of 
law has seen controversies regarding the extent to which courts have been willing to 
engage with morality and ethics,103 again raising a marked difference between 
“artificial” and “real” parts of the body.  
 
Within this framework, if IP rights exist in respect of a prosthesis, they will, as 
indicated above, confer power on the IP owner regarding use of the underlying subject 
matter (the shape of the prosthetic leg, say). This is confined, however, to carrying out 
specific acts - particularly making and selling (but importantly for patents, not repairing 
which is quite distinct)104 - during the currency of the term of the right. IP rights will 
expire across a varying landscape of dates, from 3 years for a Community unregistered 
design right to the life of the author plus 70 years in the case of the copyright in the 
                                                 
102 European Patent Convention, art 53(a), (b), (c); Patents Act 1977, s 1(3), 3(4A and Schedule 
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(T2221/10) [2014] EPOR 12, International Stem Cell Corp v Comptroller General of 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (C-364/13), [2015] 2 CMLR 26; see UKIPO Practice 
Note 25 March 2015 “Inventions involving human embryonic stem cells: 15 March 2015” 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/inventions-involving-human-embryonic-stem-cells-25-
march-2015 (last accessed 13 September 2017).  
103 WARF (n102) para 41.31;  Greenpeace (n102) para AG 45-49, 75-97, 100;  Howard 
Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541 (opposition board) section 6; T 0272/95 2002 Technical 
Board of Appeal para IV regarding proteins and childbirth; Sigrid Sterck and Julian 
Cockbain "Assessing the Morality of the Commercial Exploitation of Inventions Concerning 
Uses of Human Embryos and the Relevance of Moral Complicity: Comments on the EPO’s 
WARF Decision", (2010) 7(1) SCRIPTed 83-103 https://script-ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/7-1-Sterckx.pdf (last accessed 13 September 2017; Shawn Harmon 
et al “Dignity, plurality and patentability: the unfinished story of Brustle v Greenpeace” 
(2013) 38(1) European Law Review 92-106; Agnieszka Kupzok “Human rights in the case 
law of the EPO Boards of Appeal” in Christophe Geiger (ed) Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015);  Nicola Lucchi The 
Impact of Science and Technology on the Rights of the Individual (Switzerland: Springer, 
2016) 114-5, 141-175. 
104 United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) Ltd [2000] 4 All E.R. 35   
drawings for a prosthetic limb).105 There must also be infringing activity in a country 
where there is an IP right. This may become relevant if, say, a user moves from the UK 
to France.   
 
A key point here is that if there is a relevant right and activity, then IP owners 
have no legal responsibility to pay any attention to the impact of their decisions on 
prosthetic users.   There are some exceptions to IP infringement, however, and a key 
opportunity in respect of patents involves private and non-commercial use.106 This may 
become highly relevant as 3D printing technologies become more widespread and cost 
effective, and there may be an increase in users making their own limbs by reproducing 
prostheses which are the subject of another’s patent.107 
 
There is a possibility, therefore, of IP law having a restrictive impact on choices 
made by and (largely) for prosthesis users. This increases when it is considered that 
developers of prosthetic limbs are indeed engaging with IP rights. There are patents, for 
example for a prosthetic device made of a particular plastic material (US3908201A from 
1972), and also cases involving patents for silicon foam for covering prostheses for 
implanting in the body.108 There are registered designs, for example for a slideable and 
rotatable coupler for a prosthetic leg (UK D462767 from 2001). Copyright and 
                                                 
105  UK - copyright life plus 70 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 12; UK unregistered 
design right 15 years with licence of right for last 5 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
s216; 20 years patent Patents Act 1977, section 25; registered community design term sets of 5 
years up to 25 years and unregistered community design rights 3 years Community Design 
Regulation (n7), arts 11, 12. 
106  Smith Kline & French v Evans Medical [1989] FSR 153, Patents Act 1977, section 60(5)(a).   
107  See discussion and comparison between jurisdictions in Stefan Bechtold “3D printing, 
intellectual property and innovation policy” 2016 47(5) International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 517-536. 
108 McGhan Medical UK Ltd v Nagor Ltd (2001) 24(7) IPD 240043 
unregistered designs cannot be evidenced in the same way (given their more informal 
nature of creation), but there are examples of infringement actions being raised. Notably, 
a court rejected an argument109 that because of the so-called “must fit” provision in UK 
unregistered design law,110 there was no protection for the shape of a breast prosthesis. 
The court found that although the shape of the bra might influence the shape of the breast 
prosthesis, a bra shape did not determine the detail or circumstances of it – indeed, the 
prosthesis would fit several bras.    
 
At present, there are no accounts of IP rights being an obstacle to prosthetic 
provision in the NHS.   If there is greater use of 3D technology, and more privately 
funded prosthetic provision outside the NHS, then IP may become a more immediate 
issue.  This would then provide yet another area of challenge to the short term private 
power conferred by IP;111 and also to the conventional position that this should be 
accepted given the argument that IP encourages innovation and creativity, dissemination 
of the results and investment in the process, to the longer term benefit to all.112 
 
In summary, IP is an opportunity to be pursued by those who innovate and 
create in prostheses, looking across both the functional and the aesthetic.  When 
                                                 
109 Amoena  v Trulife [1995] 12 D-346 
110 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s213(3)(b)(i). 
111 Susan Sell Private Power, Public Goods: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003); Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman “The globalization of private 
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International Economic Law 279-320. 
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Society (Oxford: OUP, 2001); Robin Jacob “Is intellectual property the grit in the wheels of 
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assessed in the present context, the development of new prostheses which may be 
encouraged by and lead to IP rights, can indeed have positive outcomes for society and 
for individual users as they pursue ways of displaying and developing their varied 
interests and choices. This can assist in engaging with identity/identities and integrity. 
However, the discussion so far has shown that this is a hope, not a mandate outcome.   
Further, those owning IP rights are by international treaty-informed domestic 
legislation, entitled to object to uses and to raise a court action, such as those discussed 
above.113 Exercising this power can be costly and time-consuming,114 and as has been 
discussed, the IP owner may be vulnerable on various points regarding infringing 
activity, term or a relevant exception.  Yet the other party is confronted with the 
problem of facing the action – and looking forward, this could influence decision-
making in allocation of prosthetic limbs.   
 
4.3 Control and Authority for Prosthetics – Reflections  
 
The above analysis of the legal and regulatory frameworks for MD and IP, combined 
with the results of our research interviews and focus groups, reveal that the power to 
determine the nature and limitation of which prosthetic limb that will be issued 
(including for example, whether it might be suited to swimming or rock-climbing), does 
not sit with the user, and does not always even involve the user. Even if the desire is 
                                                 
113 See also TRIPS (n8), Part III and Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of 
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identified and supported, insufficient budget can frequently frustrate the realisation of 
the desire. One research interview also indicated that private fundraising (one way of 
addressing this outside the NHS) can be perceived by prosthetic users as leading to a 
prosthesis which belongs more to the donors, so this route might be even less aligned 
with the user’s identity and integrity.   Further, if a particular prosthesis which supports 
identity and integrity (e.g. running, climbing, decoration) is able to be allocated, an IP 
owner can restrict or prevent this. The identity/identities and integrity of the prosthetic 
user are not matters which are stipulated as relevant for those with authority and control 
in these decisions. Rather, there are obligations  and restrictions under NHS funding 
rules and the EU Regulation, and rights held by others under IP legislation.    
 
Steps could be taken to change these regimes.  In IP, a special exception could 
be created relating to prosthetic users and 3D printing for copyright, designs, and 
patents.  This would reflect debates ongoing elsewhere in IP with respect to users’ 
rights,  such as parody.115 Analogies could also be drawn from changes to IP law to 
enable greater and more accessible use of works by people with disabilities – e.g. 
conversion into Braille or audio versions - as can be seen from national and 
international developments.116 Another opportunity might to be create a prosthetic 
specific licensing regime117 which could avoid prosthetic users being declined particular 
opportunities on the basis of disputes over cost – whether funding is being provided 
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personally, privately or though the NHS.   Another pathway is to argue for change 
within the MD regulatory framework so that greater regard for the lives, aspirations, and 
views of users are mandated when assessing questions of need and health. This could 
build on the identification in the EU Regulation for exploration of the link between 
medicinal and cosmetic, as discussed above. Aligned with this, a third pathway would 
be to argue for a wider approach to need within the NHS policy and budgetary 
frameworks.   These three approaches, taken together, would address specific issues and 
go some way to addressing the disregard of the person, that is apparent in two key legal 
and regulatory regimes. They could also instigate a movement to delivering new 
approaches to authority and control, to identity and integrity, and to the person. 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Like the physical states to which they are applied, prosthetic limbs can challenge our 
perception of what it means to be human, to be a person.  They can challenge our symbolic 
order, or the binary categories and differentiations that we use to structure society (such 
as nature/construct, human/non-human, self/other, friend/stranger).118  Indeed, they may 
offer new categories and measures, and new possibilities and capabilities.  Yet their 
provision and usage are characterised by social, legal and ethical debates around risk, 
boundaries, and power.  The result is often a collage, or indeed a cacophony, rather than 
a consensus of values, visions, and decision-making models associated with specific 
interventions or technologies.119 And all of this is positioned against a legal landscape 
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which fails to engage (at least sufficiently) with the person, and the concepts of identity 
and integrity. 
 
More specifically, our preliminary findings from doctrinal research are that the 
current MD and IP frameworks, both of which are relevant to prosthetic limbs, adopt a 
decidedly internally focused perspective. Accordingly, the principles of each field are 
more important as shaping concepts than those deemed important (for meaning-making) 
by the prosthetics community, insofar at least as we have engaged with them.  
Generally, inadequate direct or effective regard is had to the impact of legal approaches 
and decisions on the user from both an existential and a practical perspective.  
Additionally, the regimes are insufficiently joined up, though they share an over-
reliance on largely unexamined understandings of the ‘normal’ and lack of engagement 
with others. 
 
MD and IP focus on shaping particular activities aimed at solving particular 
problems. Key drivers are safety and functionality on the one hand, and 
money/commerce and reward (with some unfocussed regard to public benefit) on the 
other.  Each of these has their own control and authority structures and there is limited 
space for user views or participation, and no focus on the core of the person and what 
the person could aspire to become.  Regarding MDs, it is tempting to argue that when 
seeking to deliver patient safety and to manage risk, there is no place for a focus on, or 
indeed engagement with, the core concepts and their legal reflections.  But this ignores 
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the arguments put forward here; it accords greater weight to the values of one legal and 
value system than to another, and stresses economics rather than enabling the pursuit of 
the identity and choice of the user – that is, their wellbeing.  Further, this accords power 
to those who have traditionally held it – doctors, the NHS, managers, IP owners and 
corporate manufacturers - rather than to users. An approach which is more open to users 
may not appeal to all users; not all may wish to exercise their choice. Yet this does not 
mean that the opportunity, together with structures which could embed wider regard for 
user groups (both locally, in each centre for the benefit of users of that centre, and 
nationally, such as the All-Party Parliamentary Limb Loss Group who advocate for 
amputees throughout the UK), should not be pursued. 
 
We conclude that there is a need for a new fair and holistic landscape for multi-
faceted decision-making regarding extensions to the person. In addition to delivering a 
new approach to decision-making by clinicians, budget setters, and IP owners, this 
should enable more attention to be paid by lawyers, policymakers, and other actors to 
issues, values, and ambitions shared by users, and also to the essential relevance of the 
person. In turn, this would support identity and integrity. At the moment, law fails to 
support effective practical delivery of prostheses or theoretical approaches to the 
person. This inadequacy cannot continue.  The suggestions made above regarding more 
exceptions to IP and a broader perspective in MD regulation can, as indicated, assist. 
But the issue is wider. One of the aims of this Wellcome Trust funded research is to 
encourage scholars, policymakers, industry, and others to think about body extensions 
not as functional tools or attachments, but as profound elements of identity in a way 
similar to race, gender and orientation.  To inform and justify this, and to further 
identify areas for new issue specific regulation, much would be gained from greater 
recognition of empirical evidence from the field/users and from the undertaking of more 
such research. This could include research and engagement with the maker movement 
which better acknowledges the creative component of prosthetics, the pursuit of 
excellence, and the human flourishing that is realised or frustrated by those with 
prosthetic limbs.  This would be a decisive change in perspective – the creation of a new 
normality and approaches to control and authority, discarding the restrictions and 
tyranny of the narrow older one, and one which will ultimately combines law, practice, 
business and users of prosthetics in a fairer way.  Pursuing this research, and how best 
to deliver this goal, is the objective of the authors.   
 
